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and agent. In many of these cases public policy and social justice would
dictate liability. But, at the common law, the principal-agent relationship must necessarily be established before the rule of respondeat
superior is applicable.
Such a result is exemplified by a recent decision handed down by
a United States District Court of North Carolina. 9 In that case a son
was using an automobile with the express consent of his mother when
an accident occurred. There was no express consent by his father, but
there was evidence that the father knew the son did occasionally drive
the car. The court held this evidence insufficient to establish that use
by the son was permissive or in pursuit of a purpose for which the
parent provided the car. Therefore the son was not acting within the
implied scope of agency necessary for invoking the Family Purpose
Doctrine. This court further stated:
The legal reasoning behind the rule is that when one provides and
maintains a car for the use, convenience and pleasure of a member
of his family, he constitutes that member his agent, and when the
member so uses it he is acting within the scope of such agency.1o

This reasoning forced the North Carolina District Court to reach
a result believed by the writer to be contrary to general public policy.

In contrast, recognition of public policy as the true legal basis of the
Family Purpose Doctrine has enabled the Kentucky Court to take a
more liberal view in applying the doctrine to impose liability. As the
Kentucky Court said in the Turner case, "The purpose of this doctrine
would be destroyed entirely if a father could relieve himself of responsibility by specific instructions known only to himself and his
son."1l

Charles E. English

INCOME TAx-AcCELERATIoN

OF DEPmCIATON ON A RACFHORSE-

Petitioner purchased a racehorse, "Baby Jeanne," in August 1948 for
$9,000. In 1949 she partially bowed a tendon and was placed on a
farm in Kentucky from April to October, 1949. During 1950 "Baby
Jeanne" raced 19 times and placed twice. On October 14, 1950, she
bowed a tendon completely and, as a racehorse, had no value. The
petitioner sold "Baby Jeanne" for $1,000 in December, 1950. Using
the straight line method, the petitioner had taken depreciation of
$1,500 ($875 in 1948 and $1,125 in 1949).

In 1950 the petitioner

claimed depreciation of $6,500 (cost of $9,000 less depreciation
9 Cronenberg v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 693, 704 (E.D.N.C. 1954).
lo Ibid.
11 Turner v. Hall's Adm'x., 252 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Ky. 1952).
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previously claimed of $1,500 and the sale price of $1,000). The
Commissioner allowed depreciation on the horse in 1948, 1949 and
1950 in the amounts of $500, $1,500 and $1,500 respectively. The Commissioner allowed the difference between the depreciated cost ($5,500)
and the sale price ($1,000)-or $4,500-as a long term capital loss. The
Tax Court1 upheld the Commissioner and the taxpayer petitioned for
a review of the decision. Held: affirmed.2 There was no showing that
the injury could be attributed to excessive use or added wear and tear.
Such showing is essential to entitle a taxpayer to an allowance for

accelerated depreciation. Whitaker v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 379
(5th Cir. 1958).
This seems to have been a case of first impression. There were no
similar cases to follow nor conflicting opinions to settle. Even analogies to machinery are somewhat superficial. Therefore, this is basically
a question of whether the statutes were properly interpreted and applied.
The court reasoned that accelerated depreciation depends upon the
showing that the effective life of the subject matter (noting that a
racehorse may be like a delicate piece of machinery) was shortened
by excessive use, added wear and tear.3 It may be conceded that accelerated depreciation with regard to machinery has been held to depend on the showing of some relationship between the excssive use
and the decreased usefulness. This requirement, however, seems to
conceive of depreciable property growing useless at a rate which can
be determined by the amount of use as the steadily operating cause.
Regardless of the reasonableness of such a concept when it concerns
machinery, etc., where replacement parts can be used to keep the
growing uselessness at a steady rate, it is not completely satisfactory
when animals are concerned. The physical incapacity of the racehorse
in this case was not physical deterioration 4 which might have been
anticipated or foreseen by the taxpayer. Termination of the horse's
IB. F. Whitaker, 27 T.C. 399 (1956).
2The court also affirmed the part of the decision holding that where under
verbal agreements the owner of a mare paid entire stud fee to owner of stud when
mare owner determined his mare was in foal and no part of such fee was withheld pending birth of a live foal, although, if a foal was not born alive, stud
fee was to be refunded, stud fees received under such agreements were income
in the year they were received rather than in the following year when the foal
was born, and refunds in case of still born foals constituted deductions in the year
paid. Whitaker v. Commissioner, 259 F.2d 379 (5th Cir. 1958).
3 Id. at 385, citing Commissioner v. H. E. Harman Coal Corp., 200 F.2d 415,
419 (4th Cir. 1952) affirming H. E. Harman Coal Corp., 16 T.C. 787, 802 (1951)
and cases cited; Copifer Lithograph Corporation, 12 T.C. 728 (1949).
4 Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 711 (2d Ed. 1939), defines "deterioration"
as: 1. "Act or process of deteriorating, or state of having deteriorated; gradual
impairment.. ." thus "deterioration" in common usage (the courts not having defined it) seems to connote a progressive process of becoming inferior.
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useful life as a racehorse was sudden and unforeseeable and could
have been the result of any one of several possible causes.5 The Tax
Court stated, "The practical question is whether the petitioner can deduct his loss in full or in part. The method used by the petitioner would
deduct it in full."- Even conceding that disallowance of the total loss
as a deduction for accelerated depreciation was justifiable under the
authorities, perhaps the loss in value should have been fully deductible
for other reasons.
It was agreed that bowing a tendon was similar to an "accident"
or the "sudden malfunctioning" of a piece of machinery.7 It may be
inferred from these words that the court was thinking of a casualty
loss. "Casualty" is defined in the dictionary as "[c]hance; accident;
contingency; also, that which comes without design or without being
foreseen; an accident."" The word may, for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code, have a slightly more restricted meaning. For purposes
of the Code a "casualty" has been defined as an event due to some
sudden, unexpected or unusual cause." The word "denotes an accident,
a mishap, some sudden invasion by a hostile agency. "10 Thus, even
using the words of the court, this loss would apparently be deductible
as a casualty loss.
Horse racing, in the Whitaker case, was one of the businesses of the
taxpayer." By asserting that the loss resulted from the casualty and
not from the sale,' 2 and that the sale only substantiated the salvage
value of the horse, it seems that the loss would have been deductible
under section 23 (e) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.13
5 U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, "Miscellaneous Diseases of Equines", Agricultural
Yearbook of 1942, at 417, 433-434. "Horses used in such sports as hunting, racing,
and polo are frequently injured in this way (sprains) as a result of overweightin fast work on a wet track or field or in rough country, improperly balanced
shoes, and the sudden stresses which are frequently encountered in competition."
"Bowed tendon" is an abnormality resulting from this strain. Accord: Lacroix,
Lameness of the Horse, 135-142.
6 27 T.C. at 406.
7 Whitaker v. Commissioner, supra note 2, at 385, where the court asserted,
"It seems to us, as it seemed to the Commissioner and the Tax Court, that bowing
of a tendon is similar to an accident or the sudden malfunctioning of a piece of
machinery." •
,
8Webster's New Int'l Dictionary 419 (2d ed. 1939).
9 Matheson v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1931), interpreting
§ 214 (a) (6), Revenue Act of 1921; also aunot. 41 A.L.R.2d 691, 696 (1955).
10 Fa v.Commissioner, 120 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1941).
11 Whtaker v. Commissioner, supra note 2, at 381.
12 Accord: Industrial Cotton Mills Co., Inc., 43 B.T.A. 107 (1940), where because bf changes in business conditions petitioner discarded certain machinery
and equipment and recovered the salvage value thereof in the taxable year the
court heldt that the loss sustained did not result from a sale of capital assets, but
instead resulted from a loss of useful value of capital assets and that the loss was
deductible in full. S.S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. United States, 102 Ct. Cl. 115,
55 F. Supp. 117 (1944) gave same effect on abandonment of branch factory
sold for salvage in the same year.
3a 53 Stat. 12 [now Int. Rev. Code 1954, § 165 (e) (1)].
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The Tax Court in the Whitaker case held 4 that the petitioner's loss
was a capital loss deductible as provided for in Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
section 117 (j).15 Normally this section would not seem to decrease
the percentage of the loss deductible in this situation. Section 117 (j)
(2) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 was the same in wording as section
1281 (a) (1) and (2) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954. In effect, if the
section 1231 losses exceed the section 1231 gains, all the section 1231
gains are treated as ordinary income, and all the section 1231 losses are
treated as ordinary losses.' 0 Thus a net loss from the involuntary conversion of a section 1231 asset held for more than 6 months 17 is treated
is not subject to the limitation on capital
as an ordinary loss' s and
9
losses in section 1211.'
Full deductibility of these losses has been recognized by the courts
on two occasions as to sales of land. 20 On another occasion the courts
recognized the full deductibility of losses on the sale of race horses
under section 117 (j) (2) of the Int.Rev. Code of 1989.21 Int.Rev. Code
of 1939, section 117 (j) (2) (B) 22 provided that "[l]osses upon the
destruction, in whole or in part, theft or seizure, or requisition or condemnation of property used in the trade or business or capital assets
held for more than 6 months shall be considered losses from a compulsory or involuntary conversion." Can the taxpayer in the Whitaker
case classify his sale as an involntary conversion under this definition?
In the Sullivan case the Tax Court went even further in interpretthis section of the Code. The Commissioner had, in order to "consider"
the losses on the sale of horses as losses from sales "of capital assets
held for more than 6 months" within the meaning of Int. Rev. Code
of 1939, section 117 (j) (2), offset against those losses all of the gains
14 B. F. Whitaker, supra note 1, at 406.

15Added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 844-847 (1942) (now Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 1231).
5221 and 5226.
10Treas. Reg. § 1.1231-1 (1957); 1 P-H 1959 Fed. Taxes 1111
17 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231 (b) (3) requires livestock to be held 12
or more for this section to apply.
months
18
Treas. Reg., § 1.121-1 (b) (2) (1957); P-H 1959 Fed. Taxes fI 5226 at
4983.
1) Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1211, limits net capital losses from sale or exchanges of capital assets to $1,000 in excess of capital gains from such sales or
exchanges.
20 Losses from sale of land upon which taxpayer had erected office building
to make it readily resalable but which he had used for twenty years in his business
of owning and renting office space were governed by Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
§ 117 (j), 53 Stat. 50 (now Int. Rev. Code 1954 § 1231), and deductible in full in
determining taxable net income. Jay Bums, 21 T.C. 857 (1954), rev'd on other
grounds, 219 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1955). Losses sustained on sales of acreage were
deductible in full under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 117 (j), 53 Stat 50 (now Int.
Rev. Code 1954 § 1231). Graves Bros. Co., 17 T.C. 1499 (1952).
21 John L. Sullivan, 17 T.C. 1420 (1952), aff'd 210 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1954)
without
22 discussion of this point.
Now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231 (a) (2).
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from sales of capital assets held for more than 6 months. 23 The Tax

Court, however, held that:
A proper interpretation is that not all gains on capital assets held for
more than 6 months are to be considered for the purposes of section
117(j) (2) but only the recognized gains from the compulsory or involuntary conversion of capital assets held for more than 6 months into
other property or money.24 (Emphasis added)

Although the court did not discuss what type of casualty was involved
in the sale of the two horses in that case, the losses were noted to be
casualty losses.25 Thus the taxpayer in the Whitaker case could, it
seems, have claimed full deductibility on his losses as an involuntary
conversion even under the section of the Code which the Commissioner
and the courts held applicable to this situation. This, however, leaves
lone question unanswered. Did the petitioner in the Whitaker case have
recognized gains from compulsory or involuntary conversion of capital
assets held more than 6 months to offset this loss? The answer to this
question cannot be ascertained from the reports of the Tax Court nor
the report of the Circuit Court.
For taxable years beginning after December 31, 1957, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, section 1231(a) is inapplicable to uninsured casualty

and theft losses. 26 Such losses will always be treated as ordinary losses
and will not offset gains which might otherwise be treated as capital
gains under section 1231.27 No such amendment, however, has been
added to exclude casualty losses from the special provisions governing reinvestment after an involuntary conversion under section 1033.28
A taxpayer would be reasonably safe in assuming that a casualty like
that in the Whitaker case would satisfy the "destruction in whole or
in part" requisite for the operation of section 1033, thus permitting him
to elect not to recognize any gain from the involuntary conversion of
29
his property.
23John L. Sullivan, 17 T.C. 1420, 1425 (1952).
24 Id.

at 1426.
25 Id. at 1423. In that case the Commissioner disallowed the casualty loss as
an ordinary deduction. This point was not discussed by the Tax Court apparently
because the court decided that the losses were nevertheless fully deductible under
§ 117 (j) (2) of the Int. Rev. Code of 1939 where the Commissioner had put
them in attempting to offset the losses against capital gains.
26 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231 (a), as amended, 72 Stat. 1642 (1958).
27 4 CCH 1959 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., f 4729.012.
28
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1033, provides that if property as a result of its
destruction in whole or in part is compulsorily or involuntarily converted, no gain
shall be recognized to the extent that the taxpayer uses, within a specified period,
money received upon such conversion when he purchases other property similar or
related in service or use to the property so converted.
29 Similar casualty losses already treated as involuntary conversions under
this section are livestock destroyed by disease [§ 1033 (f), as amended, ch. 464,
§ 5 (a), 70 Stat. 407 (1956)]. A very close analogy it seems could be drawn
between bowing a tendon and these casualties.
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Conclusion
It seems very probable that the taxpayer had a sound basis for
claiming a deduction for his loss in Whitaker. It is submitted, however,
that there are more reasonable theories than the accelerated depreciation argument upon which he proceeded. The loss would seem to be
fully deductible either as a casualty loss or as a section 117(j) 30 loss,
except for the possibility, not discernible from the statement of facts
in the particular case, that taxpayer may have had gains from similar
involuntary conversion transactions against which he would have been
required to offset the loss.
Thomas L. Jones

ToRT-NEcIFENCE-MANuFAcruER's LL4IrrY-TmuMNAT1ON OF RisK-

The plaintiff, a four-year old boy, fell from a moving automobile when
the door came open. The plaintiff's mother had recently purchased the
automobile new from defendant dealer. The door from which the plaintiff fell was known to have a tendency to "bind" and it was often necessary to slam it several times to latch it. Two other doors had previously
come open and the purchaser had taken the automobile to the dealer
for repair, but on neither occasion did she mention the "bind" in the
door from which the plaintiff fell. An action was brought against the
manufacturer and dealer alleging that the automobile was defective
and that the defendants were negligent in its manufacture and sale.
Evidence proved the automobile had been constructed with a warped
frame and defective locks. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
and from judgment entered thereon the defendants appealed on
grounds that they were entitled to a directed verdict. Held: reversed.
The purchaser, in continuing to operate the automobile daily with
knowledge that the doors could not be depended upon to function
properly, was negligent as a matter of law. This was an intervening
cause of the accident which relieved the defendants from liability. Ford
Motor Company v. Atcher, 310 S.W.2d 510 (Ky. 1957).
The Court of Appeals was faced with a problem of risk termination.
Risk termination is the extent to which the risk of harm caused by the
actor's negligence will render him liable for injuries caused thereby.
Specifically, the question before the court was whether the duty owed
to the plaintiff by the defendants was terminated by the negligence of
the purchaser in continuing to operate the automobile with knowledge
30 Now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.

